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EXPANDING THE MORTGAGE CREDIT 
BOX: LESSONS FROM THE COMMUNITY 
ADVANTAGE PROGRAM 
ROBERTO G. QUERCIA* 
SARAH RILEY** 
Abstract: The Great Recession has raised concerns about the promotion of 
homeownership to low- and moderate-income families. The subprime credit 
boom of the early 2000s was replaced with an overall credit retrenchment. 
The reforms to the housing finance system, begun with the passage of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, remain incom-
plete given the uncertain future of the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie 
Mac”). In light of this uncertainty, can or should homeownership continue to 
be supported, and if so, in what way? In this paper, we examine one model of 
targeted mortgage lending for low-income households: the Community Ad-
vantage Program (CAP). Using more than ten years of longitudinal data, we 
summarize the design and key outcomes of CAP before and after the financial 
crisis, including mortgage performance, wealth accumulation, and the drivers 
of these outcomes. We then present lessons learned and suggest innovative 
approaches for the design of similar programs in the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mortgage credit became less available with the onset of the Great Re-
cession. The Federal Reserve’s low interest rates and quantitative easing 
policies have kept interest rates at historically low levels. As such, lending 
should have increased following its traditional relationship to low interest 
rates. As interest rates decrease, we expect to see the demand for credit in-
crease. Unfortunately, the supply of credit has receded as mortgage lenders 
have pursued a flight-to-quality approach by focusing on the credit needs of 
borrowers considered less risky: those with high credit scores. 
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In all likelihood, uncertainty is making the flight to quality worse. The 
reform of the housing finance system is yet to be finished; in particular, de-
cisions have yet to be made about what to do with the two housing govern-
ment-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) since they were taken into conserva-
torship at the onset of the Great Recession. The future of the Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) has been hotly contested. There is 
no consensus between Republicans and Democrats, or within either party, 
about what that future should look like. Should the current GSEs be re-
placed with something similar in the future? Should they be replaced with a 
purely private alternative? Should they be replaced with something between 
these two extremes? Similarly, the role of the Federal Housing Administra-
tion in a reformed system remains open to debate. Under the new Admin-
istration and Congress, it is uncertain when or if such reforms will occur. 
The mortgage credit retrenchment has been well documented. Good-
man (2016) found that “borrowers who took out mortgages in the last five 
years have rarely defaulted, making them better at paying their mortgages 
than any other group of mortgage borrowers in history.” She explains that 
this pattern has two causes: “only the best borrowers are getting loans today 
and these loans are so thoroughly scrubbed and cleaned before they are 
made that hardly any of them end up going into default.” Goodman believes 
that this is clear evidence that there is a need to extend credit to borrowers 
with less than perfect credit. 
Prior to the subprime debacle, extending credit to those with less than 
perfect credit, especially low- and moderate-income and minority borrow-
ers, was supported through lending products put in place under the auspices 
of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).1 These so-called “affordable” 
lending products met one of the two criteria identified by Goodman as lead-
ing to negligible default rates among mortgage borrowers today: rigorous 
underwriting. Though often originated to borrowers with less than perfect 
credit, CRA products were thoroughly reviewed during the underwriting 
process. As a result, default rates in traditional CRA lending have been sig-
nificantly lower than in subprime lending, which targets similar borrowers. 
(Ding et al. 2011, 245–46). 
                                                                                                                           
 1 The CRA requires insured depository institutions “to help meet the credit needs of the local 
communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation of such 
institutions.” 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b). Federal banking regulators examine depository institutions on 
their CRA performance and make their CRA exam ratings public. Id. §§ 2903(a)(1), 2906(a)–(b), 
2908. Federal regulators also take an institution’s CRA performance into consideration when 
considering applications for a deposit facility. Id. § 2903(a)(2). Furthermore, bank holding com-
panies must meet minimum standards for CRA performance before they can elect to become fi-
nancial holding companies (id. § 2903(c)(1)(A)), and thereby expand their range of permissible 
nonbank activities. 
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A variety of lending programs, some private and some public, have 
promoted homeownership for low-income households. (Avery, Bostic & 
Canner 2000, 711; Galster & Santiago 2008, 60–61, 65). Although some of 
these initiatives appear to be associated with objective increases in average 
wealth and higher standards-of-living among program participants, consid-
erable outcome variability exists. (Galster & Santiago 2008, 68–76). Thus, 
key questions remain as to which aspects of targeted lending programs con-
tribute to favorable outcomes and which do not, as well as whether those 
features conducive to success can be manipulated to improve program out-
comes systematically, including better mortgage performance. 
We provide some answers to these questions by considering the expe-
riences of the homeowners who received CRA mortgages through the 
Community Advantage Program (CAP). CAP was designed as a secondary 
mortgage market demonstration program targeting low- and moderate-
income households. Its borrowers have been followed since program incep-
tion in 1998 with the goal of informing the design of targeted lending pro-
grams. A large body of research has been published about CAP; in addition 
to presenting the most recently available data concerning CAP mortgage 
performance and the home equity accumulation of CAP homeowners, we 
summarize and synthesize much of this literature as a means of identifying 
which aspects of CAP have contributed to program success and which rep-
resent potential areas for future improvement. In the concluding section, we 
derive implications for opening up the credit box to low- and moderate-
income borrowers. 
I. PROGRAM AND DATA OVERVIEW 
A. The Community Advantage Program Design 
The Community Advantage Program (CAP) is a secondary mortgage 
market demonstration program that was initiated in 1998 via a partnership 
among the Ford Foundation, the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(“Fannie Mae”), and Self-Help, a non-profit lender with headquarters in 
Durham, North Carolina. Under CAP, Self-Help purchased qualifying loans 
from the originating lenders and resold them to Fannie Mae while retaining 
recourse for an agreed-upon period of time. The Ford Foundation provided 
the original underwriting capital for this purchasing arrangement. Qualify-
ing loans were those made to households with annual incomes no greater 
than 80% of the area median income at the metropolitan statistical area lev-
el (MSAMI), or to minority households with annual incomes no greater 
than 115% of the MSAMI. CAP was designed to provide policy-relevant 
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insights with respect to community reinvestment lending, as defined by the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), and to inform future housing policy. 
Overall, more than 46,000 loans were purchased through CAP, for a 
total of more than $4 billion loaned. Purchased loans were almost exclu-
sively 30-year, fixed-rate, low down payment mortgages originated at near-
prime interest rates. (Self-Help added a small risk fee to the interest rate 
instead of requiring primary mortgage insurance from its borrowers. For all 
loans in the portfolio, this risk fee ranged between zero basis points and 150 
basis points (0% to 1.5%)). Origination dates range from 1983 to 2010, with 
95% originated after 1995. CAP loans had a median original loan-to-value 
ratio of 97% and were originated at a median interest rate of 7%. The medi-
an original loan balance was $79,000. 
B. The Community Advantage Panel Survey 
With ongoing funding from the Ford Foundation, approximately 3,700 
CAP borrowers were surveyed annually beginning in 2003. These borrow-
ers received loans between 1999 and 2003 and agreed to participate in a 
longitudinal survey panel that would collect information about their home-
ownership experiences for the purposes of academic research and program 
evaluation. In 2004, a comparison panel of about 1,500 similar renter 
households located in the same metropolitan areas was also recruited and 
interviewed. Both survey samples (owners and renters) were interviewed 
annually through the end of 2014. Detailed information about the wealth 
accumulation and asset holdings of survey participants was collected in 
2005, 2009, and 2012. The product of these data collection activities is 
known as the Community Advantage Panel Survey (CAPS). 
As is common with panel surveys, CAPS has experienced some attri-
tion of respondents over time. The sample sizes retained as of 2014, which 
was the last year of survey data collection, were approximately 1,800 own-
ers sample members and 800 renters sample members. Males and Hispanics 
have been most likely to attrit from the survey over time. (Riley, Nguyen & 
Manturuk 2015, 142–53). 
C. Population Profile: Demographics and Underwriting 
Summary statistics for the demographic and underwriting characteris-
tics of the borrowers who obtained loans through CAP are provided in Table 
1. At the time of loan origination, the median CAP borrower was thirty-two 
years old and had an annual income of $31,000 (or 60% of MSAMI), a 
credit score of 681, and a debt-to-income ratio of 37%. The median CAP 
property was valued at $84,000 at the time of purchase, and the median 
CAP borrower’s original equity in the property was approximately $2,500. 
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About 40% were members of a racial/ethnic minority group, with about 
19% black and about 14% Hispanic representation. At the time of loan orig-
ination, about 14% of CAP properties were located in rural areas, about 
32% were located in low-income census tracts, and about 30% were located 
in minority census tracts. Nearly 70% of CAP properties were located in the 
South, with approximately 30% in North Carolina. The subset of CAP bor-
rowers who participated in CAPS presents a similar profile overall, except 
that survey participants were more likely to be located in the Midwest and 
less likely to purchase a property in a minority tract. 
The CAPS renters sample exhibits important differences from the 
CAPS owners sample with respect to both demographic and geographic 
characteristics at survey baseline. Compared to the CAPS owners sample, 
survey participants in the CAPS renters sample had a higher median age at 
the survey baseline (39 vs. 32) and had a lower median household income 
($19,000, or 30% of AMI, vs. $31,000, or 54% of AMI). In addition, renters 
were more likely to be black (33% vs. 20%) or Hispanic (19% vs. 16%) and 
less likely to be male (30% vs. 54%). Renters were also less likely to be 
married (28% vs. 46%), less likely to have completed education beyond 
high school (25% vs. 39%), and less likely to be employed (63% vs. 92%). 
Finally, renters were more likely to be located in the South (74% vs. 62%). 
Because of these differences, existing analyses comparing the financial out-
comes of these two samples have tended to employ selection models or 
matching methods as a means of correcting for sample imbalance on key 
respondent attributes. 
Important differences also exist between CAPS participants and the 
larger population of low-income households. Compared with similar low-
income participants in the 2003 Current Population Survey, CAPS respond-
ents tend to be much more likely to live in the South; they also appear to be 
somewhat more educated and more attached to the labor force. Compared 
with low-income homeowners in the Current Population Survey, the CAPS 
owners sample also tends to be younger and exhibits greater representation 
of males. However, these two groups appear to be similar with respect to 
distributions of race, income, and household size. Compared with low-
income renters in the Current Population Survey, the CAPS renters sample 
demonstrates higher representation of blacks and females but similar distri-
butions of income and household size. (Riley, Ru & Quercia 2009, 251–52). 
These differences between CAPS participants and the general low-income 
population should be kept in mind when considering the generalizability of 
analyses based on CAPS data. 
As we consider the experiences of CAP borrowers, we draw from both 
Self-Help’s administrative data for the CAP portfolio as a whole and the 
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survey panel data collected through CAPS. Geocodes for the residences of 
CAPS respondents permit linkage with local geographic information and 
census data. In addition, we derive rates of return using zip-code-level 
house price estimates provided by Fannie Mae. In combination, these data 
sources permit a variety of inferences concerning both the benefits of com-
munity reinvestment lending for low-income households and the challenges 
associated with successfully facilitating homeownership for this population. 
The following discussion leverages both our direct calculations from the 
data and the cumulative work of other researchers who have used the CAP 
database for more in-depth examinations of various aspects of the low-
income homeownership experience. 
II. MORTGAGE PERFORMANCE 
A. Default and Foreclosure 
As of the end of 2015, approximately 20% of the Community Ad-
vantage Program (CAP) loan portfolio remained active. An additional 69% 
had prepaid; 4% had been returned to the originator; and 7% had been ter-
minated via foreclosure sale. With respect to worst-ever payment delin-
quency status, more than 80% of CAP loans had never been 90 or more 
days delinquent. Approximately 62% had never been delinquent at all; 15% 
had been at most 30 days delinquent; and about 4% had been at most 60 
days delinquent. 
When compared with the broader mortgage market, CAP rates of seri-
ous delinquencyi.e., at least 90 days late on payments or in foreclo-
sureduring the financial crisis tended to fall in between those for fixed-
rate prime loans and those for other mortgage products. This relationship is 
illustrated in Figure 1, which compares CAP serious delinquency rates over 
time with those for prime fixed-rate loans, prime adjustable-rate loans, sub-
prime fixed-rate loans, subprime adjustable-rate loans, and Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) loans. The figure depicts serious delinquency rates 
for all loans that are active as of each point in time, and spans the period 
from 2006, when house prices peaked, to the end of 2010, which is the most 
recent origination year for CAP loans. It is noteworthy that when subprime 
serious delinquency rates peaked in the fourth quarter of 2009, the serious 
delinquency rate for active CAP loans and FHA loans was about 10%. In 
contrast, the comparable rate for prime fixed-rate loans was about 5%, 
while those for prime adjustable-rate loans, subprime fixed-rate loans, and 
subprime adjustable-rate loans reached 18%, 22%, and 43%, respectively. 
The intermediate risk profile of CAP mortgages reflects the fact that 
CAP borrowers resembled subprime borrowers with respect to credit char-
acteristics, but received fixed-rate loans at near-prime interest rates rather 
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than subprime loans. In consequence, CAP mortgage performance does not 
reflect the layering of risk that was present for subprime loans. The mort-
gage product itself is a potentially important risk factor that can mediate the 
relationship of the borrower’s credit profile to realized mortgage perfor-
mance. (Ding et al. 2011, 254–58). 
The timing of loan origination also influences serious delinquency 
rates, as illustrated in Figure 2. The figure displays serious delinquency 
rates by vintage and seasoningi.e., months since originationfor all ac-
tive CAP loans originated between 1998 and 2008. Loans originated during 
the period of 1998 through 2004 had relatively homogenous serious delin-
quency rates and are, therefore, grouped together for purposes of presenta-
tion. Serious delinquency rates increased substantially for subsequent vin-
tages, with those loans originated in 2006 representing the highest default 
risk. 
B. Drivers of Default 
Like the performance of other mortgage products, CAP mortgage per-
formance generally reflects the impact of standard underwriting factors, 
including household income, credit score, loan-to-value ratio, and debt-to-
income ratio. (Quercia, Pennington-Cross & Tian 2012, S161–62). Thus, 
default tends to be more likely among those borrowers with lower incomes, 
lower credit scores, higher loan-to-value ratios, and higher debt-to-income 
ratios. 
Additional factors that influence CAP mortgage default include envi-
ronmental factors related to the local economy, precautionary household 
savings, and the loan origination channel. Both individual unemployment 
and the local unemployment rate increase the likelihood of default. (Tian, 
Quercia & Riley 2016, 28–35). Enduring structural unemployment at the 
local level, however, has a greater impact on mortgage default than cyclical 
unemployment. (Quercia, Pennington-Cross & Tian 2016, 364). Moreover, 
the local mix of employment opportunities appears to influence default 
rates, as urban areas with a greater diversity of accessible employment op-
tions exhibit less mortgage delinquency. (Kaza et al. 2016, 758–62). Fur-
thermore, precautionary savings can compensate for the increased default 
risk generated by unemployment shocks. (Tian, Quercia & Riley 2016, 47). 
Finally, the lending channel appears to influence default rates, as broker-
originated loans represent higher risk than those originated directly by lend-
ers. (Ding et al. 2011, 271). These drivers of CAP mortgage performance 
and their relationship to the likelihood of default are summarized in Table 2. 
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Consistent with the idea that unemployment is a key driver of mort-
gage default for CAP borrowers, default motives among CAP participants 
primarily reflect liquidity concerns rather than strategic responses to the 
house price level. In particular, most CAP borrowers who had negative eq-
uity during the financial crisis did not default on their loans, and most CAP 
borrowers who did go into default did not also have negative equity. (Riley 
2013, 24). 
C. Prepayment and Mobility 
Nearly half of Community Advantage Panel Survey (CAPS) owners 
sample members refinanced their CAP mortgages at some point during the 
study period. About 40% obtained a new fixed-rate mortgage, while about 
8% took out an adjustable-rate mortgage. Those who refinanced into adjust-
able-rate mortgages were more likely to have obtained their loans from bro-
kers rather than retail lenders. (Spader & Quercia 2011). On average, re-
financers achieved an initial interest-rate reduction of between one and two 
percentage points, and those with adjustable-rate mortgages experienced 
further interest-rate reductions as interest rates continued to fall during the 
study period. The fact that CAPS participants have been less likely than 
higher-income households to prepay their mortgages suggests that commu-
nity reinvestment mortgages may represent lower prepayment risk for lend-
ers. It may also indicate that some untapped opportunities for interest-rate 
savings via refinancing exist for households receiving such loans prior to 
declines in market interest rates. (Ratcliffe et al. 2007, 3–8; Spader & Quer-
cia 2008). For example, Spader and Quercia (2008, 694–95) compare CAP 
mobility rates with those of homeowners in the Panel Survey of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) who purchased their properties in a similar time period 
and find that about 17% of CAP borrowers moved by the end of 2005, 
compared with 36% of PSID homeowners. In addition, Ratcliffe et al. 
(2007, 6–8) compare CAP mortgage prepayment hazards with those for 
mortgages securitized by the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fan-
nie Mae”) and the Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie 
Mae”) and find that CAP prepayment rates generally have fallen below the 
others for a variety of loan vintages and interest rates. In some cases, post-
purchase counseling may be an effective means of encouraging borrowers 
to refinance when it is financially beneficial for them to do so. (Ding, Quer-
cia & Ratcliffe 2008, 319). 
 As of the last year of CAPS data collection in 2014, about half of the 
respondents in the owners survey sample had moved out of their original 
CAP residences. About 38% had moved and purchased a new residence, 
while about 14% had returned to renting. The most frequently given reasons 
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for moves during the study period involved changes in family structure, 
such as marriage or divorce, the birth of a child, or the need to care for el-
derly relatives. Secondary reasons, in order of relative importance, included 
the costs associated with paying the mortgage and maintaining the property, 
neighborhood amenities and conditions, employment opportunities, the 
characteristics of the property itself, and other miscellaneous reasons. Those 
movers who remained homeowners were more likely to move for reasons of 
family structure, while employment opportunities and the costs associated 
with homeownership were more salient for those movers who transitioned 
to renting. (Riley, Nguyen & Manturuk 2015, 149–50). 
III. HOUSE PRICE APPRECIATION AND WEALTH ACCUMULATION 
A. Rates of Appreciation and Return on Equity 
Figure 3 presents the real Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
purchase-only house price index from 1991 to 2014. We adjusted all nomi-
nal index values to 1991 values using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for 
all urban consumers less shelter. As illustrated, national house prices exhib-
ited considerable volatility during the period of Community Advantage 
Program (CAP) program evaluation. Thus, many of the CAP borrowers who 
sold their homes during the study period experienced historically high rates 
of house price appreciation and return on equity. Among those Community 
Advantage Panel Survey (CAPS) owners who sold their CAP properties 
during the survey period, 89% sold their houses for at least what they ini-
tially paid while the remaining 11% incurred a loss from sale. Those who 
experienced a gain from sale reported a median nominal gain of nearly 
$26,000, while those who experienced a loss from sale reported a median 
nominal loss of about $10,000. 
Those CAP borrowers who retained their CAP properties experienced 
modest gains more consistent with long-term rates of market appreciation. 
As of the end of 2015, CAP properties had appreciated at a nominal annual-
ized rate of 1.7% since loan origination, which corresponds to a potential 
annualized return on equity of approximately 20%. This latter leveraged 
rate of return on equity compares favorably with returns on alternative un-
leveraged investment vehicles, as the Dow Jones Industrial Average re-
turned a nominal annual return of about 4% during the period, and the 10-
year Treasury bill rate was about 5% at the time of CAP loan origination. 
These rates of return are calculated relative to the origination date for each 
loan. 
More specifically, Figure 4 illustrates the potential gains in home equi-
ty that CAP borrowers remaining in their CAP properties could have 
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achieved as a result of the evolution of house prices between CAP property 
purchase and the end of 2015. We calculate potential home equity as the 
difference between the market value of the property and the last observed 
unpaid principal balance on the CAP mortgage. At the median, CAP bor-
rowers potentially experienced nominal equity growth of about $29,000 
during the period; including the original equity held in the property at the 
time of purchase, the median CAP borrower would have accumulated a total 
of $33,000 in home equity. The upper 75th percentile represents accumulat-
ed total equity of about $60,000, while the lower 25th percentile represents 
accumulated total equity of about $16,000. This variation across CAP prop-
erties primarily reflects geographic differences in local and regional housing 
market conditions. 
B. Wealth Accumulation 
As of the end of 2012, the most recent year in which comprehensive 
wealth accumulation and asset holdings information was collected from 
CAPS participants, the owners sample reported a median net worth of ap-
proximately $70,000. This wealth represents primarily the value of home 
equity and retirement accounts, with liquid assets and the value of vehicles 
making secondary contributions. As of the end of the survey period, home 
equity represented about 23% of total net worth for the CAPS owners sam-
ple as a whole, and retirement account balances represented about 40%; net 
liquid assetsi.e., liquid assets less unsecured debtcontributed an addi-
tional 20%, followed by the net value of vehicles, at 7%. More than 70% of 
CAPS owners reported having retirement accounts during the study period. 
In contrast, the renters sample reported median net worth of approximately 
$11,000 in 2012, and about 40% reported having retirement accounts. These 
patterns are summarized in Table 4. In addition, when differences in 2005 
wealth are considered in conjunction with tenure status during the period of 
the survey, the wealth gap between the two samples is particularly pro-
nounced. For example, when those CAPS participants with less than 
$10,000 in net worth in 2005 are considered, CAPS owners who remained 
owners reached a median net worth of about $41,000 in 2012, while CAPS 
renters who remained renters accumulated less than $1,500 at the median. 
(Freeman & Quercia 2014, 4–8). Thus, CAP homeowners accumulated con-
siderably more wealth than similar renters during the study period and were 
more likely to hold investment assets other than home equity. 
One factor contributing to these differences in wealth across the own-
ers and renters samples in CAPS is the fact that the user cost of owning 
compared with renting a comparable property was lower for most of the 
study period. This pattern reflects the high levels of house price apprecia-
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tion that were observed toward the beginning of the study and the fact that 
the CAP mortgages carried very low down payments. The latter feature of 
these mortgages tended to reduce the opportunity cost of owning and to in-
crease the benefit from even small amounts of house price appreciation. 
(Riley, Ru & Feng 2013, 125, 136). A second contributing factor has in-
volved gains in equity markets, as those CAPS participants with retirement 
savings have experienced increases in net worth as a result of appreciation 
in non-housing investments. 
C. Drivers of Appreciation 
The substantial contribution of home equity to net worth for the medi-
an CAP borrower notwithstanding, some variation in house price apprecia-
tion, and thus in home equity returns, exists within the sample. Given the 
fact that CAP loans were generally originated with very low down pay-
ments, this variation is associated primarily with geographic factors, partic-
ularly local housing market conditions, the land use regulatory environ-
ment, and neighborhood demographic composition. During the housing 
market boom that took place prior to 2007, those CAP properties to experi-
ence the highest rates of appreciation were those located in neighborhoods 
with higher median house values, a higher homeownership rate, a higher 
level of neighborhood disadvantagei.e., poverty, single-parent house-
holds, etc.and a somewhat older housing stock, as well as those with a 
substantial Hispanic immigrant population, particularly in California. (Riley 
& Quercia 2011, 194–205; Stegman, Quercia & Davis 2007, 404–05). Re-
strictive land use regulations and a lack of readily developable land also 
contributed positively to house price appreciation during this period, while 
areas with higher unemployment rates experienced less appreciation. (Riley 
2012, 753–64). 
After the housing market downturn began, those properties that best 
retained their value tended to be the less expensive single-family properties 
located in more affluent neighborhoods with a somewhat older housing 
stock. In contrast, properties located in disadvantaged neighborhoods and 
areas with high homeownership rates, more restrictive regulation, less de-
velopable land, higher unemployment, and a greater prevalence of subprime 
lending experienced the greatest declines. Thus, many of those factors that 
contributed positively to house price appreciation during the housing mar-
ket boom were, in fact, associated with greater house price volatility 
throughout the period as a whole. The behavior of house prices in the most 
volatile markets may reflect a lower elasticity of housing supply in these 
areas. (Riley 2012, 753–64). The relationships of these factors to CAP 
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house price appreciation, both before and during the financial crisis, are 
summarized in Table 3. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR MORTGAGE PROGRAM DESIGN 
As described in the earlier sections, the favorable outcomes for Com-
munity Advantage Program (CAP) borrowers suggest that the credit box 
could be opened in a responsible manner. Ideally, efforts aimed at low- and 
moderate-income households should incorporate considerations of the en-
tire lending lifecycle, from the time the prospective homeowner explores 
lending options to the eventual termination of the loan, as well as environ-
mental factors that can mediate outcomes. The design process should con-
sider approaches to site selection, underwriting, servicing, and counseling 
that are conducive to these goals. Each of these various factors alone can be 
leveraged to support favorable outcomes for borrowers, but synergy may be 
achieved when they are considered concurrently. 
A. Location and Timing 
A truism about real estate is that location is the most import determi-
nant of value. Thus, the affordable homeownership experience could be en-
hanced by taking into consideration not only the characteristics of specific 
properties and neighborhoods but also the characteristics of the larger hous-
ing market. Providing relevant education and property selection assistance 
could help potential borrowers with strategic site selection in light of their 
needs, resources, and specific time horizons. 
At the property and neighborhood levels, single-family properties that 
are modestly priced but located in more affluent neighborhoods appear to 
represent the best long-term investments. Suitable properties could be iden-
tified systematically in each market, and a list could be made available to 
households in the initial stages of the home buying process. Alternatively, 
potential homebuyers could be guided to suitable options by selected real 
estate and other professionals in their local areas who have been specifically 
trained to provide this service. 
At the market level, the presence of stable and diverse employment 
opportunities is important for the long-term sustainability of homeowner-
ship among low- and moderate-income households. Declining or stagnant 
markets in which structural unemployment has taken hold are likely to be 
particularly unsuitable for these borrowers. Renting in these locations may 
be a more appropriate and less risky option. 
Moreover, the presence of restrictive land use regulation and/or land 
scarcity, which are associated with more volatile house prices, may prove 
either productive or counterproductive in the context of long-run wealth 
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accumulation. The risk premium associated with homeownership and the 
rate of house price appreciation can be higher in markets with greater levels 
of land use regulation due to the greater house price volatility that tends to 
be present in such locations. Thus, these markets have the potential to offer 
low-income homeowners a greater degree of equity accumulation. By the 
same token, however, it becomes more important in such markets to consid-
er carefully the timing of purchase and sale, or to consider the home pur-
chase decision as a long-term investment. Purchasing at the top of a declin-
ing market can lead to large losses if the market is not given time to recover 
prior to sale. In addition, in markets where homeowners experience large 
gains, there may be an increased incentive to sell, which could erode equity 
gains via the transaction costs of liquidation. Thus, expanding the credit box 
for low-income households in less regulated markets may have the pre-
ferred dual effect of promoting modest long-term wealth gains while mini-
mizing investment risks due to market volatility and timing. (Riley 2012, 
753–64). 
Given the facts that house prices fluctuate over time and that house 
price appreciation is the primary determinant of a homeowner’s user costs, 
the timing and duration of home purchase is itself also arguably an equally 
important consideration for enhancing sustainability. Homeownership is a 
long-term investment and, as such, both long-term mobility intentions and 
commitment to place are key. Providing financial incentives for reduced 
mobility (such as proactively refinancing mortgages when interest rates are 
declining) may facilitate longer investment horizons. To the extent that resi-
dential mobility is not predictable due to the unforeseeable nature of many 
life events that may induce borrowers to sell their houses and relocate, the 
judicious use of economic indicators and cost ratios may also be advisable. 
More broadly, lending efforts may be most effective if they incorporate 
market considerations. Rather than being uniformly applied throughout the 
business cycle, the characteristics of lending efforts such as cost ratios and 
other underwriting considerations could be adjusted to enhance long-term 
sustainability given current and foreseeable market conditions. For instance, 
lending efforts could be tightened during time periods when owned proper-
ties are overvalued relative to rents, and expanded during periods when the 
opposite is true. 
B. Underwriting 
Traditional underwriting factors that predict mortgage performance in 
the larger housing market are just as relevant for low-income households as 
for the general population. Thus, mortgage underwriting should carefully 
328 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 37:315 
take into consideration the income, credit history, and debt burden of each 
borrower, as well as how these factors relate to the value of the home being 
purchased and the amount of the loan being requested. 
Once creditworthiness has been established given the property being 
purchased, the lending product itself contributes directly to mortgage per-
formance. As noted by Shi and Riley (2014, 139–47), whether fixed-rate or 
adjustable-rate mortgages generate lower default rates will typically depend 
on whether the loan is originated in an increasing or decreasing interest-rate 
environment. Default rates will typically be higher for adjustable-rate mort-
gages when interest rates are increasing, and higher for fixed-rate mortgag-
es when interest rates are falling. However, given the cyclical nature of such 
rates and behavioral preferences for predictability in mortgage payments, 
fixed-rate mortgages likely represent the most suitable product for long-
term investment by low-income households. To the extent that interest rates 
can be minimized or subsidized at the time of loan origination, the layering 
of risk as a function of the payment stress experienced by the borrower will 
be minimized, as well. 
C. Counseling and Servicing 
It seems obvious that a more informed person should be a better bor-
rower than one who is less informed. However, at this point, it is not clear 
that homeownership education and counseling (HEC) has any direct impact 
on mortgage default. On the basis of our work, post-purchase in-person or 
classroom counseling can increase the likelihood that a homeowner refi-
nances when it is financially beneficial to do so. (Quercia & Spader 2008, 
305). Moreover, post-purchase counseling among borrowers who are al-
ready delinquent can improve repayment rates. (Ding, Quercia & Ratcliffe 
2008, 316–18). This observation is similar to findings that high-touch spe-
cialty servicing can improve outcomes among delinquent borrowers and 
reduce the likelihood that delinquency will escalate to foreclosure. (Steg-
man, Quercia & Davis 2007, 393; Tian, Quercia & Riley 2015, 19). 
The quality of servicing in terms of the handling of distressed loans al-
so potentially has an impact on the financial stress experienced by the 
homeowner and, thus, the homeowner’s experience with the lending pro-
gram. In particular, servicing can improve outcomes through early and regu-
lar personal contact, and through appropriate loan modifications. However, 
modifications that merely extend the loan term without a reduction in prin-
cipal or monthly cost burden appear to do little to address the financial 
stress of delinquent borrowers. (Lindblad & Riley 2015, 1093–1103). 
Moreover, modifications that do not reduce the monthly payment burden 
and/or the amount of outstanding principal represent higher redefault risk. 
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(McCoy 2014, 422–30; Quercia & Ding 2009, 184–91). Thus, to be effec-
tive, modifications must be sufficiently forgiving to address the underlying 
financial constraints that originally led to default. In those cases where a 
modification of this kind is not feasible for the lender, an expeditious fore-
closure is recommended. (Lindblad & Riley 2015, 1093–1103). 
The limited evidence supporting the role of counseling on preventing 
mortgage defaults notwithstanding, an expanded counseling or education 
requirement for low- and moderate-income borrowers may nonetheless be 
warranted on the grounds that it may facilitate better financial decision-
making as a whole. Homeownership counseling requirements may be war-
ranted especially when credit is extended to marginal borrowers. To the ex-
tent that these potential borrowers may not naturally recognize the need to 
make home purchase decisions in line with market considerations, it may 
make sense to structure affordable lending programs as ongoing supportive 
partnerships involving frequent and routine interactions between the bor-
rower and program administrators, rather than as gateways. Moreover, ad-
ministering the effort from the broader perspective of holistic financial 
growth for the targeted household, rather than from that of a lender making 
a loan, may facilitate outcomes that are not dependent on any particular 
lender but rather reflect an evolution toward greater financial independence 
under the guidance of a support organization that provides ongoing partner-
ship in the form of education and counseling. In this sense, viewing a lend-
ing program for marginal borrowers simply as a lending program may limit 
the effectiveness of such an effort, given the interdependence of financial 
decision-making in regards to homeownership and other components of the 
household balance sheet. A more robust framework may involve the partici-
pation of a variety of stakeholders, including not only the lender but also 
realtors, economists and other market analysts, specialty servicers, and fi-
nancial educators and counselors. All of these stakeholders could be 
brought together under a third-party roof that would provide necessary co-
ordination and team oversight so that program participants receive the bal-
anced and ongoing individualized support that they need to succeed. 
CONCLUSION 
The persistent nature of the debate concerning the desirability and fea-
sibility of supporting homeownership for low- and moderate-income house-
holds in regards to both opening up the credit box and reforming the hous-
ing finance system speaks to the need for clarity about why some such ef-
forts work and others do not. By considering the outcomes of low-income 
homeowners who received mortgages through the Community Advantage 
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Program (CAP), we have identified a variety of success factors that can be 
leveraged in the design of future lending programs. At the median, CAP 
participants experienced positive house price appreciation and substantial 
increases in home equity between loan origination and the end of 2015. 
Their overall gains in wealth greatly exceed that for similar renters during 
the same time period. Moreover, foreclosure rates for CAP borrowers have 
remained well below those for subprime mortgage loans made to similar 
borrowers during the same time period. The factors contributing to the rela-
tive success of CAP include careful underwriting and mortgage product se-
lection (echoing Goodman (2016)), as well as proactive servicing. Moreo-
ver, the outcome variation that exists within the program highlights the need 
for careful consideration of the potential effects of market timing and prop-
erty location. As a means of generating synergy among these various pro-
gram components, we suggest that a collaborative model of long-term part-
nership among diverse stakeholders, rather than a lender-centric program 
orientation, may be most conducive to achieving optimal participant out-
comes. 
When properly done, as reflected in the CAP experience, extending 
mortgage credit to low- and moderate income borrowers can be both sus-
tainable and profitable. Opening the credit box to these borrowers with the 
right products would be beneficial to all stakeholders. In the longer run, the 
reform of the housing finance system should take into account support for 
the credit needs of the low- and moderate-income households who are ready 
to assume the promise of homeownership. 
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  N=46,547 N=3,743 N=1,529 
Age (median, years) 32 32 39 
Income (median, $) 30,792 30,672 19,000 
Income (median, % of AMI) 60 58 33 
Male (%) 57 54 30 
Race (%)    
     White 61 61 44 
     Black 19 20 33 
     Hispanic  14 16 19 
     Other 6 3 4 
Marital status (%)    
     Married . 46 28 
     Widowed/divorced/separated . 20 32 
     Never married . 35 40 
Educational attainment (%)    
     Less than High School . 9 20 
     High school diploma or GED . 51 55 
     Associate's or trade school degree . 14 8 
     Bachelor's degree . 19 13 
     Graduate degree . 6 4 
Employment status (%)    
     Working . 92 63 
     Unemployed (looking for work) . 3 12 
     Out of labor force . 3 20 
     Retired . 2 5 
Geographic region (%)    
     Midwest 16 26 14 
     Northeast 4 3 0 
     South 69 62 74 
     West 12 10 12 
Rural (%) 14 18 . 
Low-income tract (%) 32 30 . 
Minority tract (%) 30 25 . 
Purchase price (median, $) 84,000 77,500 . 
Loan amount (median, $) 79,000 74,775 . 
Original loan-to-value ratio (median, %) 97 97 . 
Original debt-to-income ratio (median, %) 37 37 . 
Original credit score (median) 681 673 . 
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Table 2. Key Drivers of CAP Mortgage Default 
Borrower and Loan Characteristics Direction of Impact 
Household income - 
Loan-to-value ratio (original or current) + 
Debt-to-income ratio (i.e., back-end ratio) + 
Credit score - 
Unemployment + 
Precautionary savings - 
Environmental Characteristics 
Local unemployment rate (especially structural component) + 
Diversity of local employment opportunities - 
Broker origination channel + 
Note: See Ding et al. (2011); Quercia, Pennington-Cross & Tian (2012); Tian, Quercia & 
Riley (2016); Quercia, Pennington-Cross & Tian (2016); and Kaza et al. (2016).   
 
 
Table 3. Key Drivers of CAP House Price Appreciation 
Direction of Impact 
Property Characteristics Before 2007 2007-2010 Overall 
Purchase price - - - 
Single family  n.s.  + + 
Neighborhood Characteristics 
Homeownership rate + - - 
Median property value + + + 
Median property age + + + 
Hispanic immigrant population + n.s. + 
Disadvantage scale + - + 
Subprime origination rate n.s.  - - 
Regional Characteristics 
Restrictive land use regulation + - - 
Unavailable land share + - n.s. 
Unemployment rate - - - 
Notes: (1) The abbreviation “n.s.” indicates not statistically significant. (2) See Stegman, 
Quercia & Davis (2007); Riley & Quercia (2011); and Riley (2012).  
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Table 4. Wealth Accumulation by CAPS Owners and Renters  
Owners Sample Renters Sample 
Median net worth $71,664  $11,266  
Home equity share of net worth 23% 22% 
Retirement accounts share of net worth 40% 45% 
Net liquid assets share of net worth 20% 11% 
Net value of vehicles share of net worth 7% 9% 
Percent holding retirement accounts 70% 40% 
Note: The renters sample's home equity share of net worth reflects the facts that (1) ap-
proximately 35% of the renters sample became owners during the survey period, and (2) 
the total net worth of renters who did not become owners represents a much smaller share 
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Figure 4. 
 
Data sources: CAP database; Fannie Mae 
 
